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INTRODUCTION
In the endless and seemingly futile government war against drugs,
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution may have fallen by the wayside as courts struggle to
deal with drug offenders. The compelling government interest in
controlling the influx of drugs all too often results in a judicial atti-
tude that the ends justify the means. Judges can be reluctant to ex-
clude evidence of drugs found in an unlawful search pursuant to the
exclusionary rule,1 which provides that illegally obtained evidence
may not be used at trial. The exclusion of drugs as evidence in drug
cases often results in a dismissal of the case.2
1. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (holding that violations of the Fourth Amendment result in exclusion of the
evidence illegally obtained).
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
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The courts do not reach this exclusionary quandary, however, if
investigatory techniques used to discover the drugs are not covered
by the Fourth Amendment. If the court holds that a given technique
is not a search, no Fourth Amendment inquiry ensues. This is ex-
actly what is happening to some investigatory techniques used in
the "drug war." Canine sniffs, 3 aerial searches, 4 and drug field tests
have all been upheld on the ground that these techniques are not
searches within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Withdraw-
ing judicial scrutiny from these techniques results in a growing
sphere of government activity that is unreviewable. When govern-
ment activity is unreviewable, the law enforcement process is open
to abusive use of otherwise reasonable investigatory techniques.
This Comment focuses exclusively on canine sniffs and argues that
sniffs should be considered searches to be analyzed properly under
the Fourth Amendment.
In United States v. Place,6 the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced in dictum that a canine sniff of luggage in an airport was
not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Before Place, state courts had taken various approaches to dealing
with the question of whether a canine sniff was a search under the
Fourth Amendment. These approaches resulted in conflicting hold-
ings.7 Since Place, canine sniffs have generally been upheld, even
when they occur outside of airports." What is disturbing, however, is
that the Place discussion of canine sniffs was strictly dictum in that
it was not essential to the outcome of the case. 9 This has not pre-
vented subsequent courts from expanding and further delineating
the rather terse assertion by the Court that sniffs are not searches.
Thus, while Place might be read as limiting permissible sniffs of lug-
(1914). In drug cases the exclusionary rule is particularly problematic for the general
public. Because mere possession of drugs constitutes a crime, exclusion of the drugs
will leave the government without a case. Moreover, the defendant will go free and
unpunished for violating the law. When drugs are excluded because of a constitu-
tional violation, the public perceives this as "letting a criminal off on a technicality."
Consequently, judges are in a quandary, forced to consider competing constitutional
and public demands.
3. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
4. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
5. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
6. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
7. See Stefan Epstein, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog to Detect Narcotics on
Drugs As Unreasonable Search in Violation of Fourth Amendment 31 A.L.R. FED.
931 for a discussion of state and federal cases addressing the constitutionality of ca-
nine sniffs before Place.
8. See, e.g., infra notes 10-13.
9. The Court's holding in Place was that a seizure of the defendant's luggage for
over ninety minutes exceeded the limits of an investigative stop and thus violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
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gage to sniffs conducted in public places, its subsequent application
by lower courts has not been so limited.
Most of the courts that have dealt with the issue of dog sniffs,
have taken Place literally and have applied it to any number of situ-
ations using a slightly different Fourth Amendment analysis.'0 Many
courts have held that a canine sniff is not a search by relying on the
Place dictum.1 Other courts have held either that a canine sniff is
presumptively reasonable 12 or that a canine sniff must be weighed
against the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
or item sniffed.' 3
Four states courts to date, Alaska, New Hampshire, New York,
and Pennsylvania, have voiced their disapproval of the United
States Supreme Court's assertion that sniffs are not searches, and
have reacted by interpreting their own state constitutional search
and seizure provisions to hold that sniffs are searches."' The Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, recently had occa-
sion to review whether a canine sniff of a package was a search and
the court concluded that it was not, basing its decision on the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' 5 In reaching
its conclusion, the Law Court clearly relied on the Supreme Court
dictum in Place and on United States v. Jacobsen,'0 which is dis-
cussed below.
Since the dictum in Place, the Supreme Court has not reanalyzed
its position that canine sniffs are not "searches" in the context of
the Fourth Amendment. Although Place was widely criticized for its
10. See, e.g., United States v. Decker, 956 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1992) (United Parcel
Service package subjected to canine sniff); United States v. Rodriguez-Moralea, 929
F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1991) (canine sniff of exterior of legally impounded vehicle); United
States v. Thomas, 787 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (canine sniff of closed container
inside vehicle).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Dovali-Avila, 895 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289
(9th Cir. 1984).
12. United States v. Trayer, 701 F. Supp. 250 (D.D.C. 1988); United States v.
Liberto, 660 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1987), affd without op., 838 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
13. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2nd Cir. 1985), cert. den., 474 U.S.
819 (1985); United States v. Sklar, 721 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1989); State v. Snitkin,
681 P.2d 980 (Haw. 1984);.State v. Stamphill, 769 P.2d 861 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
14. See Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293 (Alaska CL App. 1985); State v. Pellicci,
580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990); Common-
wealth v. Johnston, 515 A.2d 454 (Pa. 1987).
15. State v. Phaneuf, 597 A.2d 55 (Me. 1991).
16. 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (upholding the field testing of a white powder that con-
firmed the powder was cocaine). Place and Jacobsen, decided one year after Place,
should be read together because much of the discussion in Jacobsen is an extension
of the dialogue in Place. Moreover, Justice Brennan's dissent in Jacobsen points out
that most of his criticisms are equally applicable to the majority analysis in Place.
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judicial treatment of canine sniffs,' there has been little examina-
tion of the subsequent effects of Place and the systematic use of
canines today in the war against drugs.' In light of the limited find-
ing in Place that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is not a
search, it is worth examining how courts are assessing the validity of
canine sniffs in a variety of situations.
This Comment will first describe the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment analysis to the extent that it is possible to find any
bright line rules. Part II will examine the status of canine sniffs in
the federal and state courts after Place. The status of dog sniffs in
most federal courts is clear; sniffs are not considered searches. State
courts, however, are free to and should adopt a different position
under state constitutions. Several states have independently ex-
amined a dog sniff under their state constitutions and have con-
cluded that sniffs are to be considered searches and, therefore, wor-
thy of protection.
Part III will suggest some alternatives to the approach used in
Place and will argue that the Supreme Court should revisit the is-
sue. The flawed analysis in Place has resulted in both the inconsis-
tent and incomprehensible treatment of Fourth Amendment consid-
erations implicated by a canine sniff. It is evident that the criticisms
of Place are even more relevant today, after ten years of dog sniff
case law.
Finally, this Comment will conclude with a brief examination of a
better way to approach canine sniffs. At the very least, a dog sniff
should be considered a search, albeit perhaps, presumptively reason-
able. Dog sniffs should be examined in light of the particular cir-
cumstances in which the dog was used. Although a dog sniff of lug-
gage in an airline terminal may be reasonable, clearly there are
different considerations when a dog is used in dragnets or when a
dog is used to sniff a person. The Supreme Court's failure to estab-
lish any concrete guidelines for when a canine sniff becomes an im-
permissible search means the Court has placed Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence into the hands of law enforcement officials. There is a
need for a clearer Fourth Amendment analysis that on the one hand
supports the reasonable use of dogs and on the other hand recog-
17. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(f) (1988) (criticizing the
Supreme Court's holding in Place); Linda M. Sickman, Fourth Amend-
ment-Limited Luggage Seizures Valid on Reasonable Suspicion, 74 S. CT. REV.
1225 (1983) (arguing that although support exists for holding that sniffs are not
searches, there is equally persuasive support for holding that sniffs do constitute
searches).
18. The use of drug-sniffing dogs, however, may be curtailed in the future given
the prevalence of drug residue on U.S. currency. See Mark Corriden, Courts Reject
Drug-Tainted Evidence, ABA J., Aug. 1993, at 22 (Seventy percent of U.S. currency
in circulation is tainted with trace amounts of cocaine. Trained drug-sniffing dogs are
able to detect these trace amounts on currency.).
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nizes that canine sniffs are searches. In this way, the Fourth Amend-
ment will serve as a limitation upon unreasonable canine sniffs.
L THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment maxim that is most often repeated but
seldom followed by the Supreme Court was expressed in Katz v.
United States:' "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions. '20 When Katz was de-
cided in 1967, there were few exceptions to the warrant requirement
for a search under the Fourth Amendment." Shortly thereafter,
however, the Supreme Court came to recognize several more
exceptions.
22
In later years, these exceptions were broadened to meet the need
by law enforcement officials to adapt to changing social circum-
stances, an increasing crime rate, and the apparent impractical re-
quirement of obtaining a warrant before conducting a search.2 3 As a
result, the Court has moved away from the strict standard enunci-
ated in Katz, to a more permissive attitude toward government con-
duct. Many modern Fourth Amendment cases deal with defendants
involved in drug activity whereby the court is asked to review gov-
ernment conduct in obtaining drug evidence. Many scholars have at-
tributed the Court's relaxed Fourth Amendment analysis to the
"war on drugs" 24 and judicial abhorrence of the exclusionary rule.25
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted).
21. For example, at the time Katz was decided, the Supreme Court had recog-
nized an "automobile exception" that allowed a warrantless search of a motor vehicle
when the officer had probable cause to believe the car contained contraband. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border
searches); Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (search pursuant to vol-
untary consent); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop-and-frisk searches for weapons); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (seizure of objects in plain view).
23. For example, the automobile exception permits searches of stationary vehicles,
see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), and a stop-and-frisk can last 20 min-
utes without violating Terry v. Ohio, see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675
(1985).
24. See, e.g., Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging Drug Exception to the
Bill of Rights, 38 HASMNGS L.J. 889, 909 (1987) ("The result of the War on Drugs is
thus a gradual, but inexorable, expansion of enforcement powers at the expense of
personal freedoms."). See generally, Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking
Fourth Amendment, 21 AhL Cami. L. Rxv. 257 (1984); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another
Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (as illustrated by the Open
Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 1 (1986).
25. See, e.g., John M. Burkoff, When is a Search Not a "Search?" Fourth
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Most recently, very few exceptions to the warrant requirement
have been created; instead, the Court has adopted restrictive inter-
pretations of what constitutes a "search." 2 When the Court refuses
to acknowledge certain police investigative techniques as "searches,"
the Court has effectively removed the conduct from judicial scru-
tiny. If conduct is not a "search," then the Fourth Amendment does
not apply. In addition, the Court has indicated that as long as the
search is "reasonable," no warrant is required.27 This last test, how-
ever, completely ignores the presumptive warrant requirement and,
instead, uses an ad hoc balancing analysis to determine whether the
law enforcement officer's conduct meets a threshold of objective rea-
sonableness viewing the circumstances as a whole.2 8
To understand better the various analyses used by the Supreme
Court, it is useful to examine a representative sampling of decisions
to explain three of the most significant approaches used when the
Court attempts to determine whether a violation of the Fourth
Amendment has occurred.2 9 This discussion will demonstrate the
shift away from the hard and fast rule that warrants should be re-
quired before conducting a search, towards the rule that a reasona-
ble search does not require a warrant. Most of the cases mentioned
below concern the seizure of drugs. This is no accident. The per-
ceived drug crisis and subsequent drug war have significantly con-
tributed to the number of Fourth Amendment decisions in the past
Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 515, 523-24 (1984).
[W]hile a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court continue to accept
(however tenuously) the proposition that the only way the fourth amend-
ment can be effectively enforced is through an evidentiary exclusionary
rule, use of such a rule necessarily means that at least some few presumedly
"guilty" criminals will be set free. This prospect, however seldom it occurs
in actuality, has had a significant effect on the way some justices have ap-
proached, interpreted and applied the fourth amendment....
Id. at 523 (footnotes omitted).
See also John M. Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The
Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 Op. L. REV. 151, 190-92
(1979); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest On A "Prin-
cipled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition?" 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565,
645-46 (1983).
26. A narrow interpretation of a "search" has led to permitting aerial surveillance,
see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), drug field tests, see United States v. Jacob-
sen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), and most importantly for the purposes of this Comment,
drug-sniffing dogs in the airport, see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
27. See discussion infra Part I.C.
28. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of school girl's
purse deemed reasonable); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989) (drug tests of government employees may be reasonable).
29. See infra discussion in Part I and cases cited therein. The cases chosen are by
no means intended to suggest that they are the only important ones but are meant to
serve as examples of Fourth Amendment analysis.
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fifteen years.30
A. Katz v. United States: Presumptively Unreasonable
Warrantless Searches and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
This Comment's starting point for tracing Fourth Amendment
analysis is Katz v. United States.31 Although Justice Harlan's con-
currence in Katz has become the most influential part of the opin-
ion,32 it is useful to examine the majority opinion as well. Katz was
charged with transmitting wagering information by telephone across
state lines. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction because FBI
actions in bugging the exterior of the booth where Katz placed his
bets was an unconstitutional warrantless search. In language that is
still widely quoted, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, em-
phatically stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."33 Furthermore, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected."'" Notwithstanding the fact that Katz placed his calls from
an area where he could be seen, Katz was entitled to exclude the
"uninvited ear."'3 5 The act of shutting the booth door was enough for
the Court to conclude that Katz had expressed a desire for privacy
from the world. The government's recording devices violated the
privacy expectation that the Court found Katz was entitled to hold
and, thus, the recording was deemed to be a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment. 6
Turning the inquiry to whether the search was constitutional, the
Court found the lack of a warrant fatal to the government's case.
The government argued that because the recording was narrowly
circumscribed to when Katz was placing calls, and tailored for the
specific purpose of learning the content of only his conversations, it
did no more than what it was entitled to do had a warrant been
issued. The Court rejected the theory that the government's self-
imposed restraint was sufficient to justify a warrantless search and
30. For reasoned discussions on the connection between the drug war and appar-
ent shrinking Fourth Amendment protection, see generally, Wisotsky, supra note 24;
Daniel J. Larkosh, Note, The Shrinking Scope of Individual Privacy: Drug Cases
Make Bad Law, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1009 (1990).
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32. See infra note 40.
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351. The Court rejected the method of
assigning Fourth Amendment protection to "constitutionally protected areas." See,
e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
438-39 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961).
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 352.
36. Id. at 353.
MAINE LAW REVIEW
stated "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions. '37 The Court refused to cre-
ate a new exception and reversed Katz's conviction.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan set forth his under-
standing of the majority's reference to "people not places."38 In a
two-part test, Harlan stated that the Fourth Amendment requires
"first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' ",s9 before a search will be un-
constitutional. Justice Harlan required a threshold determination
that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
item or area searched. Although Justice Harlan did not explicitly
define "reasonable" in Katz, he extended Fourth Amendment pro-
tection to Katz because Katz had a legitimate expectation of privacy
when he closed the booth door that lasted as long as he was speak-
ing on the telephone. Later decisions by the Courts have followed
Harlan's test.40
Katz clearly stands for two propositions: first, that the Fourth
Amendment protects individuals, not places; and second, that it pro-
tects whatever individual expectations of privacy the Court is pre-
pared to say are reasonable. The holding in Katz also means that if
a search does not fall within some exception to the warrant require-
ment, and if a privacy interest is implicated, the search violates the
Fourth Amendment. Katz, therefore, also stands for strict enforce-
ment of the warrant requirement.
In Mincey v. Arizona,'41 the Supreme Court, following Katz, re-
versed the Arizona Supreme Court decision that created a "murder
scene" exception to the warrant requirement. The murder scene ex-
ception42 was held to be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.
37. Id. at 357. The Court held that the facts did not warrant a finding of any of
the established exceptions: search incident to arrest, automobile exception, hot pur-
suit, or consent. Id.
38. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90 (1987); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
41. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
42. The Arizona Supreme Court expressed its murder scene exception as follows:
We hold a reasonable, warrantless search of the scene of a homicide-or of
a serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to
suspect foul play-does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution where the law enforcement officers were legally on the
premises in the first instance .... For the search to be reasonable, the pur-
pose must be limited to determining the circumstances of death and the
scope must not exceed that purpose. The search must also begin within a
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Following the analysis set forth in Katz, Justice Stewart held that
the intrusive search conducted without a warrant was per se
unreasonable. 43
The fairly complicated facts of Mincey can be briefly summarized
as follows: During a narcotics raid on Mincey's apartment, an under-
cover police officer, who had slipped into Mincey's bedroom, was
found shot and later died. Homicide detectives conducted an ex-
haustive warrantless search of Mincey's apartment for four days and
seized over 200 objects. Mincey was convicted of murder, assault,
and several narcotic charges. During the trial and appeal, Mincey
claimed that the evidence that was seized from his apartment
should be suppressed. The Arizona Supreme Court, however, held
that a warrantless search of a homicide scene did not violate the
Fourth Amendment so long as the search was reasonably limited to
determining the circumstances of the death.4 The United States
Supreme Court did not agree."
Beginning with the premise that warrantless searches are unrea-
sonable unless they fall under a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement, the Supreme Court held that Arizona failed "to show
the existence of such an exceptional situation" that would justify
creating a new exception.4" Following Justice Harlan's reasoning in
Katz, the Court first held that the act of taking Mincey into custody
did not lessen Mincey's reasonable expectation of privacy in his
apartment. 47 Second, no exigent circumstances existed to justify a
warrantless search.4" Third, the Court rejected Arizona's argument
that a vital state interest in investigating serious crimes made the
search reasonable.49 The Court reasoned "[i]f the warrantless search
of a homicide scene is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of
the scene of a rape, a robbery, or a burglary."'0
In Mincey, the Court simply could not envision a "rational limita-
tion" of the interest in investigating crimes. 1 The Arizona Supreme
Court's guidelines for using the "murder-scene" exception "confer
reasonable period following the time when the officials first learn of the
murder (or potential murder).
State v. Mincey, 566 P.2d 273, 283 (Ariz. 1977) (citation omitted).
43. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 390.
44. State v. Mincey, 566 P.2d at 283.
45. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 390.
46. Id. at 391 (quoting Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); see United States
v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)).
47. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 391-92.
48. Id. at 392-93.
49. Id. at 393-94.
50. Id. at 393. Indeed, the warrantless search conducted here is far more "reason-
able" than the warrantless searches in O'Connor v. Ortega and New Jersey v. T.L.O.
See infra Section C of this part.
51. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 US.
752, 766 (1969)).
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unbridled discretion upon the individual officer to interpret" its
terms.5 2 In other words, police officers should not be called upon to
interpret "reasonableness" by themselves. Like the FBI in Katz, the
police in Mincey would have been granted a warrant had they ap-
plied for one.53 This does not, however, make the warrantless search
retroactively constitutional.
Because the murder scene exception did not conform with any of
the other existing exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Su-
preme Court rejected the Arizona Supreme Court's analysis.5 4 Thus,
in 1978, Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy standard
was still controlling and the warrant requirement was again strictly
enforced.
B. Smith and Jacobsen: Rethinking a "Search"
One year after Mincey, the Supreme Court decided Smith v.
Maryland.55 The Court, purporting to rely on the analysis set forth
in Katz, declined to classify the installation and use of a pen register
a "search." 5 As such, the analysis used in Smith marks the subtle
shift from protecting the individual from any government intrusion
to the more recent view that certain intrusions are not searches,
thereby allowing some government intrusion. This precludes the fur-
ther inquiry required under the Fourth Amendment regarding the
reasonableness of the intrusion.
Smith was suspected of robbing a victim's house and later threat-
ening her in obscene phone calls. At the request of the police and
without a warrant, the telephone company installed a pen register
on Smith's residential telephone to record the telephone numbers
dialed from his home. The installation subsequently revealed that
Smith telephoned the robbery victim. On the basis of these recorded
calls, the police obtained a warrant to search Smith's house. Subse-
quently, Smith was convicted for robbery. 7
52. Id. at 395. See supra, note 42, for a description of the murder scene exception
as set forth by the Arizona Supreme Court.
53. Specifically, the Court said, "It may well be that the circumstances described
by the Arizona Supreme Court would usually be constitutionally sufficient to warrant
a search of substantial scope. But the Fourth Amendment requires that this judg-
ment in each case be made in the first instance by a neutral magistrate." Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. at 395.
54. Id. at 394.
55. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
56. Id. at 742-43. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers
dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on
the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not
indicate whether calls are actually completed." United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977). A pen register "is usually installed at a central telephone
facility . . . [and] records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from [the] line" to
which it is attached. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974).
57. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 737-38.
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On appeal, Smith challenged the pen register on the basis that it
was a search conducted without a warrant. Specifically Smith argued
that the government infringed a "legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy ' and thus conducted a warrantless search. Not only did the
Supreme Court deny that Smith was entitled to an expectation of
privacy in the numbers he dialed, it stated that even if he had such
an expectation, it was one that society was not prepared to recognize
as reasonable. 9
In analyzing the first prong of Justice Harlan's test, Justice Black-
mun, writing for the majority, concluded that given the fact that the
actual numbers dialed on the telephone are reported to the tele-
phone company for billing, no telephone customer actually believes
that the numbers themselves are private. Regarding the second
prong of Harlan's test, the Court was not prepared to say that
Smith's expectations were reasonable, even if Smith himself be-
lieved he had an expectation of privacy.60 Furthermore, in a leap of
logic criticized by the dissent, the Court stated that "[iln these cir-
cumstances, petitioner assumed the risk that the information would
be divulged to the police." 6' 1 Therefore, the installation and subse-
quent use of the pen register by police did not require a warrant
because it could not be deemed a "search". 2
Justice Stewart in his dissent stated that telephone numbers di-
aled from a private telephone "are not without 'content'" and thus
should be afforded Fourth Amendment protection from disclosure.s
Justice Marshall, in a separate dissent, was concerned about the ma-
jority's assertion that individuals conveying information to a third
party somehow have "assumed the risk" that the information will be
conveyed to law enforcement officials." This is particularly dis-
turbing, he noted, because "unless a person is prepared to forgo use
of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he
58. Id. at 741.
59. Id. at 743.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 745. This "assumption of risk" language is reminiscent of United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), where the Supreme Court held that a bank depositor
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in financial information "voluntarily" given
to banks. "The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government." Id. at 443 (citing
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)).
62. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
63. Justice Stewart stated,
I doubt there are any [telephone subscribers] who would be happy to have
broadcast to the world a list of the local or long distance numbers they have
called. This is not because such a list might in some sense be incriminating,
but because it easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the
places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life.
Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance. ' 'e
Although the majority purported to follow the test that Justice
Harlan articulated in Katz, it applied a restrictive interpretation of
"reasonable expectation of privacy" to preclude a finding that a
search had been conducted. Furthermore, the Court added an "as-
sumption of risk" component to preclude a person from having a
"legitimate" subjective expectation that the telephone numbers
would not be released to the police.6 It would have been a reasona-
ble extension of the majority holding in Katz, however, to conclude
that a person is entitled to believe the number he dialed "will not be
broadcast to the world. '6 7
In United States v. Jacobsen s the Court again refused to find a
search when Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) workers reopened a
Federal Express package and field tested a white powder substance,
found to be cocaine. The package was damaged and Federal Express
employees noticed some bags inside the tube. Suspecting drugs in-
side the package, Federal Express called in the DEA. The Court
held that reopening the package did not enable the DEA to learn
anything that the Federal Express employees had not learned when
they opened the package the first time. Thus, reopening the package
did not infringe upon any "legitimate expectation of privacy."' 9 The
Court independently examined the propriety of the field test and
concluded that, given the limited function of the test, no search oc-
curred. 0 Although the majority uses the language from Katz, the
opinion makes only passing reference to it in two footnotes.7 1
The Jacobsen Court began its opinion by stating that the original
opening of the package, if conducted by the government, would have
assuredly required a warrant.72 Because the parties were private em-
65. Id. at 750.
66. In a compelling article, When is a Search not a "Search?" Fourth Amend-
ment Doublethink, supra note 25, Professor Burkoff asks:
Did the Supreme Court majority truly believe that Smith knew (or
should have known) that he was communicating the numbers he dialed to
the police when he made his phone calls? Frankly that's a difficult conclu-
sion to accept, difficult even if one accepts arguendo the equally dubious
proposition that Smith knew (or should have known) that the telephone
numbers he dialed were routinely intercepted by the telephone company.
Id. at 538. The next question that ought to be asked, following Burkoff's reasoning, is
whether society is entitled to believe that the numbers taken down by the telephone
company are to remain private between the company and its customer? Society ex-
pects that police should have to get a warrant before examining their private tele-
phone records. Therefore, in Smith there was a far less intrusive method of investiga-
tion available to the police (i.e. a warrant).
67. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 352.
68. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
69. Id. at 120.
70. Id. at 122-25.
71. Id. at 118 n.14 , 122 n.22.
72. "Even when government agents may lawfully seize such a package to prevent
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ployees of Federal Express, however, the Fourth Amendment did
not apply to the original search.7 3 The Court then applied the "as-
sumption of risk" principle: "It is well settled that when an individ-
ual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that
his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if
that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental
use of that information. '7 4 The Court ruled that once the Federal
Express employees told the DEA what they had seen, the defend-
ant's original expectation of privacy in the package was frustrated.
As to the reopening of the package, the Court measured the rea-
sonableness of DEA actions in light of what the DEA already knew;
for instance, the package contained some suspicious bags of white
powder. 5 Based on what the DEA learned from Federal Express,
the Court concluded that Jacobsen had no privacy interest in the
package and thus reopening the package was not a search.
Turning to the question of whether the field test was a search, the
Court asserted that the limited information learned from such a test
was not enough to be termed a search. Relying heavily on dictum in
United States v. Place71 that a dog sniff was not a search, the Court
found that merely detecting the presence or nonpresence of drugs
could not compromise any "legitimate interest in privacy."" It is
unclear, however, how the majority finesses the question of slicing
loss or destruction of suspected contraband, the Fourth Amendment requires that
they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package." Id. at 114.
73. Id. at 115.
74. Id. at 117. The Court continued-
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confi-
dence placed in a third party will not be betrayed.
Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). It is difficult to under-
stand how the defendant here had assumed a risk when he was not aware, nor could
he be, that the Federal Express employees had opened his package. As Justice Mar-
shall argued in Smith v. Maryland, "It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative." Smith v. Ma-
ryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. "The additional invasions of respondents' privacy by the Government agent
must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search."
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115.
76. 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983). See infra Part II.
77. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. "Congress has decided-and there
is no real question about its power to do so-to treat the interest in 'privately' pos-
sessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a
substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate
privacy interest." Id. It is interesting to note that the use of metal detectors, which
presumably only detect the presence of metal, are searches under the Fourth Amend-
ment. See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th
Cir. 1972).
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the bags open to remove a portion of the powder for testing. Surely,
some privacy interest is implicated when the bag is opened. Whereas
a dog sniff in Place did not require any physical intrusion into
Place's luggage, the bag in Jacobsen had to be opened in order to
conduct the field test. Apparently, this was not significant in reach-
ing a determination as to whether a search had occurred upon field
testing the powder.
Justice White dissented from the Court's assertion that Jacobsen's
expectation of privacy was frustrated after the Federal Express em-
ployees had already opened the package.7 8 Citing Walter v. United
States7 1 he stated: "[T]his conclusion cannot rest on the proposi-
tion that the owner no longer has a subjective expectation of privacy
since a person's expectation of privacy cannot be altered by subse-
quent events of which he was unaware."' 0 Justice Brennan, also dis-
senting in Jacobsen, reiterated his objections to Place and added:
"Presumably, the premise of Place was that an individual could not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the presence or absence
of narcotics in his luggage." ' Justice Brennan particularly disliked
the method by which the majority withdrew a sophisticated surveil-
lance technique from Fourth Amendment review.8 2
By manipulating Justice Harlan's expectation of privacy test, the
Court circumvents the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. If
there is no search, no warrant is required. The Court in Smith and
Jacobsen was disingenuous, at the least, when it acknowledged on
the one hand that certain police techniques were intrusive upon the
individual (albeit minimally so), yet found that the individual had
"assumed the risk" that the information he sought to keep private
would be discovered. In Smith, the Court imposed its substantive
judgment upon the facts and determined that no one could have an
expectation that the numbers he dialed on his residential telephone
would not be disclosed to the police.83
In Jacobsen, the Court stretched the doctrine of assumption of
risk to its extreme. It seems absurd to believe that Jacobsen as-
78. Justice White concurred in Part III of the opinion, which found that the field
test was constitutionally permissible, and concurred in the judgment, because he
would have accepted the Magistrate's findings that the bags were in plain view when
the DEA arrived. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 126, 127.
79. 447 U.S. 649, 659 (1980).
80. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 132 (White, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
81. Id. at 135 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A more complete discussion of Justice
Brennan's disagreement with the majority's analysis in Place and Jacobsen will be
taken up in Part III as part of the criticism of the Court's recent approach to redefin-
ing Fourth Amendment protections.
82. Id. at 140-41.
83. Assuming Smith knew he was violating the law when he made threatening
phone calls, it is hard to believe that Smith would have made those calls from his
home if he were aware the numbers were being recorded.
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sumed the risk that the Federal Express employees would disclose
the contents of his package when he was unaware the package had
been opened. Clearly, members of the general populace would be
chilled to learn that every time they send a package through a pri-
vate carrier, the senders assume the risk that the package could be
opened and searched by law enforcement officials. This is inconsis-
tent with Supreme Court decisions holding that first class packages
are protected from warrantless searches.'
It is interesting to note how the Court applied the test Justice
Harlan articulated in Katz to Jacobsen and Smith. Jacobsen failed
the first prong of Harlan's test; the Court decided that Jacobsen
could not have had a subjective expectation of privacy in a package
that had already been opened by Federal Express employees. Smith
failed both prongs of Harlan's test. First, the Court decided that
Smith could not have had a subjective expectation of privacy in the
telephone numbers he dialed because he knew the numbers were re-
corded by the telephone company. Second, the Court reasoned that
even if Smith had had an expectation of privacy, that expectation
was an unreasonable one.
Clearly, the Court ignored Justice Harlan's Fourth Amendment
analysis which must "transcend the search for subjective expecta-
tions, or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations,
and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that
translate into rules the customs and values of the past and pre-
sent."'85 The Court also ignored the public's legitimate belief that
sealed packages may not be opened without a warrant, whereas Jus-
tice Harlan could have found that the public has never believed that
a sender assumes the risk that a package could be opened and
searched. Harlan could also have found that the public has not as-
sumed the risk that numbers dialed from their private telephones
would be released to the police. By refusing to acknowledge that the
conduct in question was a search, the Court avoided the flat prohibi-
tion of warrantless searches outlined in Katz.
C. Warrantless Searches: Reasonable Under All the
Circumstances
The Supreme Court recently demonstrated a willingness to evade
the warrant requirement by declaring that a search was a reasonable
one under all the circumstances.86 The Court has established that if
84. The law on this is clear. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Oliver v.
United States, 239 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957). Mail matter other than first-clas mail is
not entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protection. See Web3ter v. United
States, 92 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1937).
85. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985).
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the search is deemed reasonable, no warrant is required. When the
Court applies the "reasonableness test," it implicitly acknowledges
that a search occurred. Thus, the Fourth Amendment already ap-
plies and the only issue remaining is whether a warrant should have
been issued. The following cases, New Jersey v. T.L.O.87 and
O'Connor v. Ortega,"" demonstrate the shift from denying the exis-
tence of a search in the first instance towards examining searches
under a standard of reasonableness.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court upheld the legality of a search
of a student's purse conducted by a school official. The student was
caught smoking in a school lavatory, whereupon she was taken to
the assistant vice principal, who opened the student's purse and
searched through it for cigarettes. He found cigarettes, rolling pa-
pers, and a small amount of marijuana. In addition, several letters in
the purse implicated her in dealing drugs. No warrant was ever ob-
tained. Thereafter, the student was brought up on delinquency
charges. The juvenile court denied her motion to suppress the evi-
dence taken from her purse, but the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the assistant vice principal did not have reason-
able grounds to search the purse.89
In order to determine whether a search had occurred, the Su-
preme Court used a balancing test, weighing the student's legitimate
expectations of privacy against the school's legitimate need to main-
tain an environment conducive to learning.90 Although the Supreme
Court acknowledged that a search did occur and that school children
do have legitimate expectations of privacy in their personal belong-
ings, the Court held that the search was reasonable.91 The majority
does not begin its analysis of reasonableness by using Katz as the
starting point. Indeed, any discussion of Katz is conspicuously ab-
sent. Instead the Court relied heavily on Terry v. Ohio9 2 to create
another exception to the warrant requirement, although the Court
never acknowledged it as such.93
87. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
88. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
89. State in Interest of T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934, 942 (N.J. 1983).
90. 469 U.S. at 340.
91. Id. at 338-43.
92. 392 U.S. 1 (1967). Terry permits officers, during a lawful stop, to frisk the
outer clothing of a suspect. If anything like a weapon is felt, the officer may romove
that weapon from the suspect. The Court's reasoning in creating this exception to the
warrant requirement was that officers should be permitted to prevent harm to them-
selves or to innocent bystanders. It is important to remember that Terry allowed only
frisks for weapons and did not entitle the officer to remove anything else from a sus-
pect's clothing. Thus, although the frisk represents an intrusion upon a person's pri-
vacy, a balance was struck in favor of a frisk because of the exigent circumstances
involved in an on-the-spot investigation.
93. The warrant requirement was considered an undue interference with the
school's ability to impose informal disciplinary procedures. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
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Citing Camara v. Municipal Court," the Court stated "[t]he de-
termination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific
class of searches requires 'balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails.' , The Court conceded that
searching a student's purse was a serious invasion of her privacy but
asserted that the circumstances as a whole warranted such inva-
sion.8 The school setting, however, "requires some easing of the re-
strictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily sub-
ject." 7 The warrant requirement was considered an undue
interference with the school's ability to impose informal disciplinary
procedures.8 The search was reasonable because of the compelling
state interest, notwithstanding the lack of probable cause to
search. 9
In a more recent case, O'Connor v. Ortega,00 a plurality used the
reasonableness balancing test to conclude that a government em-
ployer's search of an employee's locked desk and file cabinets was
reasonable. 01 The Court remanded the case, however, to determine
whether the supervisor was justified in entering the office and
whether the scope of the search was reasonable. 02
The Court held that expectations of privacy differ depending on
the context of the search. Thus, in the workplace, public employees'
"expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets...
may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures
or by legitimate regulation."'103 As a practical matter, however, the
Court accepted the lower court's decision that Ortega had a legiti-
U.S. at 340.
94. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
95. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. at 536-37).
96. Id. at 337-38, 343-48.
97. Id. at 340.
98. Id. at 341.
99. Justice Brennan in his dissent correctly pointed out that
full scale searches-whether conducted in accordance with the warrant re-
quirement or pursuant to one of its exceptions--are "reasonable" in Fourth
Amendment terms only on a showing of probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be found in
the place to be searched.
Id. 354 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)).
100. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
101. Id. at 725-26.
102. The employee, Dr. Ortega, was suspected of improprieties. While he was on
paid administrative leave, the supervisor entered his office and searched his desk and
file cabinets, and seized items, including a Valentine's Day card, a photograph, and a
book of poetry. Dr. O'Connor maintained that the purpose of the search was to secure
state property and to search for evidence to use against him in administrative disci-
plinary proceedings. No warrant was obtained. Id. at 712-14, 729.
103. Id. at 717.
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mate expectation of privacy in his desk and files.1 ' Notwithstanding
Ortega's expectation, the Court proceeded to examine the govern-
ment's justifications for work-related intrusions and found them to
be reasonable.105 The Court determined that the state needed to
provide efficient and proper operation in the workplace and had a
right to investigate misconduct as long as the search was reasona-
ble.106 The Court remanded the case for a determination on whether
the conduct was reasonable under all the circumstances. 107
Four of the Justices dissented from the majority.108 Justice Black-
mun disagreed that the "special need" exception in T.L.O. was con-
trolling. He wrote that "no 'special need' exists here to justify dis-
pensing with the warrant and probable cause requirements."10 9 In
addition, the dissenting Justices pointed out the plurality's failure
to balance the warrant requirement against the government inter-
est.110 It stated, "By ignoring the specific facts of this case, and by
announcing in the abstract a standard as to the reasonableness of an
employer's workplace searches, the plurality undermines not only
the Fourth Amendment rights of public employees but also any fur-
ther analysis of the constitutionality of public employer searches."111
Thus, the dissenting Justices emphasized that while Ortega was
away for two weeks, a warrant easily could have been obtained.11 2
The following table summarizes the foregoing discussion of the six
Fourth Amendment cases.
104. Id. at 717-18.
105. Id. at 720-21.
106. Id. at 723-24.
107. Id. at 729.
108. Justice Blackmun joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice
Stevens, dissented.
109. Id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 745.
111. Id. at 748.
112. Indeed, the question should be asked whether, under these circumstances,
requiring the hospital to obtain a warrant would have been unreasonable. Aftor all,
there was not any opportunity for Ortega to destroy evidence because Ortega was
forced to take administrative leave.
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learning environment
ORTEGA Balance expectation of Reasonable search, no
privacy with Hospital's warrant necessary
Looking through need to provide efficient
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IL CANINE SNIFFS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In United States v. Place, the Supreme Court adopted the analy-
sis that canine sniffs do not invade one's expectation of privacy and
thus do not constitute "searches."11 Although the issue ultimately
decided in that case concerned whether a seizure had occurred, the
Court gratuitously offered its analysis of dog sniffs in dicta.114 One
year later, in 1984, the Court used the same analysis to determine
the existence of a search in United States u. Jacobsen,1 thus ce-
113. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
114. Id. at 707.
115. 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984).
HOLDING:
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menting Place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Most of the
federal courts since Place have upheld the use of canine sniffs with-
out warrants.""' Some factual situations in which the sniffs arise,
however, differ from the facts in Place."'7 These differences under-
score the difficulty of applying the analysis in Place to subsequent
cases.
Because the Court in Place did not fully examine the issue of dog
sniffs, it is unclear whether sniffs are never searches or whether
sniffs are not searches only when conducted in airports. The Court
in Jacobsen made it clear, however, that some police techniques
(field tests and dog sniffs) are deemed outside the purview of the
Fourth Amendment because of the limited nature of the intrusion.
Thus, if a police technique reveals only the presence or absence of
contraband, the Court does not recognize a search. This is so, appar-
ently, notwithstanding the defendant's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the area or object that is subjected to the sniff.
Perhaps society is prepared to accept canine sniffs as another
price of the drug war. That is, if sniffs will help stop the influx and
use of drugs in society, potential violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment are a small price to pay. Under this view, however, there is a
risk that certain police investigative techniques will be completely
unreviewable by the judicial system.'1 8 The government is necessa-
rily given wide discretion to make on the spot judgments without
the use of a neutral magistrate. Such unreviewable discretion is dis-
turbing because there are better ways to accomplish both drug de-
tection and judicial review of police conduct without abandoning
Fourth Amendment analysis."19
This Part will review the cursory examination afforded to canine
sniffs by the Supreme Court in United States v. Place. Thereafter,
this Part will examine the analyses used by federal courts in cases
involving dog sniffs decided subsequent to Place. A few state court
decisions will be reviewed as well because they demonstrate some
courts' apparent willingness to interpret state provisions securing
people from unreasonable searches more broadly than the Supreme
Court interprets the United States Constitution regarding unreason-
able searches. Although the analysis used in Place is followed in the
116. See infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
117. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
118. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 136-37 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
119. As this Comment argues, the United States Supreme Court should recognize
that sniffs are searches. Once this is established, the Court could then proceed to
analyze each case on its own facts, as it apparently wants to do. The warrantless sniff
would be reasonable if the police have a reasonable suspicion of the presence of drugs
in the area sniffed. In certain circumstances where the public expects a high degree of
privacy, such as a sniff of a home or a person, the police would have to show probable
cause before proceeding.
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majority of state dog sniff cases, a large number of states have not
yet faced this issue. Therefore, challenges of dog sniffs under state
constitutions may be more successful than challenges based on the
United States Constitution.
A. United States v. Place
The relevant facts of Place are as follows: A "suspicious-looking"
traveller was pulled aside by DEA officers in La Guardia Airport.
The officers asked for identification and told Place that he was sus-
pected of carrying narcotics. Place refused to consent to a search of
his luggage. The agents then took the luggage to Kennedy Airport
and subjected it to a sniff test. The police dog reacted positively and
a warrant was obtained. Officials found cocaine in the suitcase and
Place was ultimately convicted for possession of narcotics.1 20 The
Supreme Court reversed Place's conviction because the ninety-min-
ute detention of Place's luggage exceeded the bounds of a Terry
stop.121 The dog sniff, however, was not violative of the Fourth
Amendment because it was not a "search. 1 22
The Court focused its examination on the limited investigative
nature of a sniff. Because a sniff does not require opening the lug-
gage and rummaging through its contents, a sniff was deemed
"much less intrusive than a typical search.1 123 Indeed, "the canine
sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure
that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the
procedure."'24
Three Justices disagreed with the majority's dictum that stated a
dog sniff was not a search. Comparing dog sniffs to electronic re-
cording devices, Justice Brennan concluded that a sniff was more
intrusive than a bugging device. 125 In a separate concurrence, Justice
120. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 696-99.
121. Id. at 709. In addition to permitting a pat-down frisk of the outer clothing,
Terry v. Ohio permits the police to stop a person to ask questions in the pursuit of an
investigation upon a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal ac-
tivity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1968).
122. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 719-20 (Brennan, J., concurring in result). The following year in
United States v. Jacobsen, Justice Brennan expanded on his difficulty with the ma-
jority's decision:
What is most startling about the Court's interpretation of the term
"search", both in [Jacobsen] and in Place, is its exclusive focus on the na-
ture of the information or item sought and revealed through the use of a
surveillance technique, rather than on the context in which the information
or item is concealed. Combining this approach with the blanket assump-
tion, implicit in Place and explicit in [Jacobsen] that individuals in our
society have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the fact that they have
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Blackmun faulted the Court for reaching a hasty decision on the
issue of dog sniffs. 2 ' Justice Blackmun suggested that the Court's
decision, while plausible, failed to address other possible ap-
proaches. 12 7 He particularly objected to deciding an issue that had
not been raised or argued by either of the parties.2 "
The majority in Place did not engage in the Fourth Amendment
analysis that was used in Katz. Instead, it focused only on the na-
ture of the technique used. Nowhere was there a discussion of bal-
ancing Place's legitimate expectation of privacy in his locked lug-
gage with the extent of the intrusion. This type of cursory analysis
invites the criticism that has been aimed at recent Fourth Amend-
ment decisions. 29 Namely, the Court believes that no one may have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband. In other words,
the illegal nature of the contraband necessarily determines the ab-
sence of any legitimate expectation of privacy.1 0
The approach used by the majority was similar to that used in
Smith and Jacobsen 31 in that because there was no search, no war-
rant was required. The similarity in approach, however, stops there.
At least in those cases the Court analyzed the defendant's privacy
expectation even if none was found. It would be surprising indeed, if
the Court determined that Place had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in his luggage. The Court conceded that the sniff was intru-
sive but less intrusive than a typical search. Thus, even though the
two-part test of Katz would appear to indicate there was a search,
the Court held there was no search."'
contraband in their possession, the Court adopts a general rule that a sur-
veillance technique does not constitute a search if it reveals only whether or
not an individual possesses contraband.
466 U.S. 109, 137 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment).
127. "For example, a dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that
could be justified in this situation under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion." Id.
128. Id.
129. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 133-43. Justice Bren-
nan argued that the majority's focus on the nature of the item sought and revealed
through the dog sniff results in the theory that individuals have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the fact that they are carrying contraband. This, he argued is
contrary to the "fundamental principle that '[a] search prosecuted in violation of the
Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light.' "Id. at 140 (quoting Byars
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927)).
130. See supra note 77.
131. See supra Section B, Part I.
132. Place exhibited an actual expectation of privacy when he refused to consent
to have his luggage searched. An expectation of privacy in one's luggage is probably
recognized as reasonable by society. Thus, under Katz, a search occurred. A proper
analysis would have then determined whether the police had demonstrated an ar-
ticulable suspicion that Place's luggage contained drugs that justified the warrantless
search.
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B. Post-Place: Federal Courts
Many federal courts have followed the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Place and Jacobsen.133 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, however, held that a dog sniff conducted outside
of an apartment did invade a substantial liberty interest and the
sniff was an impermissible warrantless search.13' Decisions of other
circuit courts have generally ignored the location where the sniff oc-
curs. Often, the federal courts quote from the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis in Place stating that a dog sniff is not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.3 5 For example, sniffs of mail
packages"3 6 and train compartments 3 " are treated alike. A few fed-
eral court opinions have attempted to reconcile the Second Circuit's
decision in United States v. Thomas,138 that a dog sniff outside an
apartment constituted a search, with the Supreme Court's opinion
in Place. In so doing, they implicitly acknowledge that there may be
certain circumstances in which a dog sniff might be considered a
search. 9 Thus, the issue of whether Place applies regardless of the
circumstances, or whether Place should be limited to certain public
133. See discussion infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
134. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985). Specifically, the court
held:
Here the defendant had a legitimate expectation that the contents of his
closed apartment would remain private, that they could not be "sensed"
from outside his door. Use of the trained dog impermissibly intruded on
that legitimate expectation. The Supreme Court in Place found only "that
the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue
here-exposure of respondents luggage, which was located in a public
place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment." Because of defendant Wheelings' heightened
expectation of privacy inside his dwelling, the canine sniff at his door con.
stituted a search.
Id. at 1367 (quoting United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45 (1983) (citation
omitted).
135. The portion of the Place opinion that is most often cited is 462 U.S. at 707.
See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361, 1363 (8th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 203-04 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fifty-
Three Thousand Eighty-Two Dollars in U.S. Currency, 773 F. Supp. 26, 30 (E.D.
Mich. 1991); United States v. Sklar, 721 F. Supp. 7, 13 (D. Mass. 1989).
136. United States v. England, 971 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1992); Garmon v. Foust, 741
F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Sklar, 721 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1989).
137. United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Liberto, 660 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1987).
138. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
139. See United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 n.1 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[United
States v. Thomas,] based as it was, on the 'heightened expectation of privacy' in the
home, is distinguishable."); United States v. Liberto, 660 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D.D.C.
1987) (declining to extend the Thomas holding to train roomette); United States v.
Sklar, 721 F. Supp. 7, 14 (D. Mass. 1989) ("The Court is convinced that the privacy
interest asserted by Sklar is more akin to that discussed by the Supreme Court in
Place (luggage) than ihat discussed by the Second Circuit in Thomas (apartment).").
MANE LAW REVIEW
places, is not entirely closed.
When the circumstances are similar to those in Place, federal
courts have followed Place. That is, if the dog sniffed luggage in an
airport, bus, or train, the courts dispose of the issue by merely refer-
ring to Place.40 In addition, consistent with the limited privacy ex-
pectation afforded to persons travelling across United States bor-
ders, the use of drug-sniffing dogs by border police has been held
not to be a search.14 1
The more difficult problem arises when the circumstances under
which the dog sniff occurred implicate a higher expectation of pri-
vacy. For example, in the future there may be division among the
circuits as to whether a dog may jump inside a car to sniff for
drugs. 42 Furthermore, in light of the Second Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Thomas,'4 there may be disagreement over
whether a sniff outside of one's residence constitutes a search.144
Another problem arises when roaming police dogs indiscriminately
sniff everything in sight. Several courts have intimated that Justice
Brennan's dissent in Jacobsen, warning of the consequences of the
140. See generally United States v. Maldonado-Espinosa, 968 F.2d 101 (1st Cir.
1992) (airline luggage); United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1992) (bus
luggage); United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1992) (bus luggage); United
States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1991) (train luggage); United States v.
Riley, 927 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1991) (airline luggage); United States v. Mondello, 927
F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1991) (airline luggage); United States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910 (5th
Cir. 1988) (airline luggage); United States v. Lewis, 708 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1983)
(airline luggage); United States v. Doe, 786 F. Supp. 1073 (D.P.R. 1991) (airline
luggage).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 934 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1991).
142. Although the Tenth Circuit held that a dog jumping inside a validly stopped
vehicle was not a search, it did acknowledge that:
[E]ven though the police could use a trained dog to sniff the exterior of
[the] automobile, the [use of the] dog created a troubling issue under the
Fourth Amendment when it entered the hatchback. People have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the interiors of their automobiles; police may
not search an automobile unless they have probable cause to believe it con-
tains contraband.
United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that because there was no evidence that the dog was encouraged to climb into
the car, it was not a search. On the other hand, the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas recently held:
The placing of a dog inside the trunk and passenger compartment of a car
must be considered an invasive search requiring probable cause. Just as an
officer could not enter the passenger compartment or trunk of a vehicle to
conduct a search without probable cause, neither can a canine be placed
inside a car on less than this standard.
United States v. Thomas, 787 F. Supp. 663, 684 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
143. See supra note 134.
144. See also United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1988). Although
the court held that bringing a dog into a train roomette to smell the interior was
permissible, the court stated, "Place obviously did not sanction the indiscriminate,
blanket use of trained dogs in all contexts." Id. at 857.
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majority's position, will be taken seriously if the need arises." ' This
warning has not prevented some courts from concluding, however,
that canine sniffs of luggage 14 6 and lawfully stopped cars,1' regard-
less of probable cause, are not searches. This conclusion might be
extended to sniffs of mail packages, although in recent cases, dog
sniffs of packages have occurred when there was a reasonable suspi-
cion that a particular parcel contained drugs." 8
The vast majority of federal court decisions that address dog
sniffs arise in the context of sniffing luggage. Thus, these cases
would require only a plain application of the dicta in Place. Courts
seem to be digressing, however, from the assertion in Place that
sniffs are never searches. Some courts have acknowledged that sniffs
occurring in areas traditionally recognized as having heightened pri-
vacy expectations might be searches.14' To date, however, only the
Second Circuit has limited Place's holding to public places where
people have lessened expectations of privacy.
C. Post-Place: State Courts
Most state courts that have considered dog sniffs under the
Fourth Amendment within the past ten years have applied the Su-
145. As Justice Brennan notes in Jacobsen:
[U]nder the Court's analysis in [Jacobsen and Place], law enforcement of-
ficers could release a trained cocaine-sensitive dog. . . to roam the streets
at random, alerting the officers to people carrying cocaine. . . . Or, if a de-
vice were developed that, when aimed at a person, would detect instantane-
ously whether the person is carrying cocaine, there would be no Fourth
Amendment bar, under the Court's approach, to the police setting up such
a device on a street corner and scanning all passersby.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 138 Brennan, J., dissenting). To this set of
horrible hypotheticals, the Tenth Circuit responded, "this type of canine confronta-
tion is not before us, however, and we reserve the question of the constitutionality of
such hypothetical situations for another day." United States v. Morale3-Zamora, 914
F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Decker, 956 F.2d 773, 779
(8th Cir. 1992) ("More pointedly, the propriety of Hicks' deployment of a drug-snif-
fing dog must be resolved, particularly with respect to whether reasonable suspicion
must exist in order to justify a canine sniff.").
146. See United States v. Maldonado-Espinosa, 968 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1992);
United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Doe, 786 F.
Supp. 1073 (D.P.R. 1991).
147. See United States v. Taylor, 934 F.2d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Rodriguez-Mordes, 929 F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1991).
148. See United States v. England, 971 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1992); Garmon v. Foust,
741 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Sklar, 721 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1989).
But cf. United States v. Decker, 956 F.2d at 777 (holding that decision by a DEA
agent to allow a canine sniff of a package must be reasonable).
149. See United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. White-
head, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.
1985); United States v. Sklar, 721 F. Supp. at 14; United States v. Liberto, 660 F.
Supp. 889, 891 (D.D.C. 1987).
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preme Court's analysis in Place when deciding whether sniffs are
searches. 150 Some state courts have declined to follow the Supreme
Court's ruling and have instead proceeded to interpret indepen-
dently their own state constitutions.151 Perhaps, given the apparent
willingness of the federal courts to adopt the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis in Place at face value, state courts are the only remaining fora
where a defendant's claim that a sniff invaded a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy may be sustained.
State v. Phaneuf'5 2 is a good example of a state's adoption of the
Place Fourth Amendment analysis with respect to dog sniffs. 153 In
an opinion just as cursory as the Supreme Court's opinion in Place,
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, upheld
Phaneuf's conviction for drug possession that was based on a dog
sniff of a package that had been mailed to Phaneuf.
In 1987, the postal inspector in Boston informed the United
States Attorney's office that Raymond Phaneuf was suspected of
sending and receiving drugs from the Blaine Post Office in Maine.
The postmaster and the Maine State Police were notified. When the
150. See State v. Paredes, 810 P.2d 607 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (canine sniff of
outside of car is not search); People v. Salih, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1009 (1985) (canine
sniff of UPS package not a search); People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1986); State
v. Hammond, 1993 Del. Super. Lxs 156 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (canine sniff of UPS
package not a search); Joseph v. State, 588 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (use
of sniff dog during normal course of traffic stop does not constitute search); State v.
Snitkin, 681 P.2d 980 (Haw. 1984) (sniff of sealed container not a search under state
constitution); People v. Statham, 568 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (exposure of
luggage to a canine sniff is not search); State v. Daly, 789 P.2d 1203 (Kan. 1990);
State v. Rose, 604 So. 2d 974 (La. App. 1992) (canine sniff of luggage not a search);
State v. Phaneuf, 597 A.2d 55 (Me. 1991) (canine sniff of package was not a search);
Titow v. State, 542 A.2d 397 (Md. App. 1988) (may subject luggage to canine sniff if
detention is less than 90 minutes); State v. Morrison, 500 N.W.2d 547 (Neb. 1993)
(canine sniff of luggage not a search); State v. Cancel, 607 A.2d 199 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992) (canine sniff of luggage not a search); State v. Villanueva, 796 P.2d
252 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); State v. McDaniels, 405 S.E.2d 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(canine sniff of exterior of briefcase not a search); State v. Riley, 1993 Ohio App.
L xis 3284 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (canine sniff of exterior of car not a search); State v.
Slowikowski, 743 P.2d 1126 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (dog sniff outside storage locker not a
sniff); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987); Strout v. State, 688 S.W.2d
188 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (dog sniff outside semi-public locker did not intrude upon a
legitimate expectation of privacy and thus was not a search); Brown v. Common-
wealth, 421 S.E.2d 877 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (canine sniff of automobile not a search).
151. See Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Pellicci,
580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990); Common-
wealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993) (all holding that dog sniffs are searches).
152. 597 A.2d 55 (Me. 1991).
153. It should be noted that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has never inde-
pendently adopted a broader exclusionary rula for the Maine State Constitution. See
State v. Veglua, 620 A.2d 276, 278 (Me. 1993) ("To date we have neither accepted nor
rejected a separate exclusionary rule for violation of the State Constitution, much less
exceptions to such a rule."). See also State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Me.
1991); State v. Thornton, 485 A.2d 952 (Me. 1984).
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detectives arrived at the Blaine Post Office, they were shown a pack-
age that was addressed to Phaneuf. The postmaster agreed to detain
the package until it could be subjected to a dog sniff. A subsequent
dog sniff indicated that the package contained contraband. Phaneuf
was informed that his package could be picked up at the post office.
As he left the post office with the package, the detectives asked
Phaneuf to return to the post office where he was advised of his
Miranda rights. Phaneuf waived his rights and admitted that the
package contained cocaine.'"
The Law Court relied on Place and Jacobsen to hold that the
sniff did not violate Phaneuf's Fourth Amendment rights. Citing Ja-
cobsen, the Law Court asserted that "[c]ongress has decided. . to
treat the interest in 'privately' possessing cocaine as illegitimate;
thus government conduct that can reveal whether a substance is co-
caine, and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legiti-
mate privacy interest."1 55 The Law Court similarly disposed of
Phaneuf's claim that he had a heightened expectation of privacy in
first class mail.156
Justice Glassman, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's use of
Supreme Court dictum and found that the facts of Place and Jacob-
sen were clearly distinguishable. Justice Glassman reasoned that ap-
propriate security measures inside a public air terminal reduce
travellers' legitimate expectation of privacy in their luggage.1 5 7 Jus-
tice Glassman distinguished Jacobsen because there the drugs were
in plain view.158 Glassman drew support from the United States Su-
preme Court's admission in Jacobsen that had the government
opened the package the first time without a warrant, the search
would have been presumptively unreasonable.1 0 Having disposed of
the two cases, Justice Glassman stated that the Katz test should
have been controlling to determine the existence of a search."'
Two other state cases demonstrate an alternative to the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment analysis of dog sniffs. First, in State v.
Pellicci,1'6 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire refused to adopt
the Place rationale for determining whether a canine sniff consti-
tuted a search under the New Hampshire Constitution's search and
seizure provision.16 2 Instead, the New Hampshire Supreme Court fo-
154. State v. Phaneuf, 597 A.2d at 56-57.
155. Id. at 57 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 58 (Glassman, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 59.
160. Id.
161. 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990).
162. The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated: "[A]s Pellicci correctly argues,
we have held our Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than the
Federal Constitution." Id. at 715.
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cused on the state interpretation of "search" and concluded:
Employing a trained canine to sniff a person's private vehicle in
order to determine whether controlled substances are concealed in-
side is certainly a search in these terms .... The sniff, in short,
was a prying by officers into the contents of Pellicci's possession
which, concealed as they were from public view, could not have
been evident to the officers before the prying began.163
Although the court held that the sniff was a search, it also deter-
mined that the limited nature of the sniff was reasonable in Pel-
licci's case in part because it was based on "a reasonable and articul-
able suspicion of imminent criminal activity.'
1 64
In another recent state decision, People v. Dunn,6 5 the Court of
Appeals of New York held that although a canine sniff outside
someone's apartment did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the sniff was a
search within the meaning of the New York Constitution. The New
York Court of Appeals' rationale was that the dog sniff enabled the
police "to obtain information regarding the contents of a place that
has traditionally been accorded a heightened expectation of pri-
vacy."'"6 The court of appeals rejected the Supreme Court's asser-
tion that the limited information learned through a dog sniff means
a search has not occurred. It stated, "[u]nlike the Supreme Court,
we believe that the fact that a given investigative procedure can dis-
close only evidence of criminality should have little bearing on
whether it constitutes a search. 1 6 7 The Court likened sniffing odors
to the sound waves gathered by the surveillance in Katz.0 s
Like Pellicci, the search in Dunn was deemed reasonable because
the police had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant's apart-
ment contained drugs.69 Notwithstanding the fact that the search
was constitutional, by holding generally that sniffs are searches, the
court of appeals precluded roving canine sniffs without justifica-
tion.170 This view is far more protective of individual rights than the
163. Id. at 716. Under the New Hampshire Constitution "[a] search ordinarily
implies a quest by an officer of the law, a prying into hidden places for that which is
concealed." Id.
164. Id. at 717 (citing State v. McCann, 467 A.2d 571, 573 (N.H. 1983)). In Pel-
licci, each of the presiding four justices had different ideas about whether the sniff
was a search and if so, whether it was reasonable. Justice Brock, concurring specially,
would hold that the sniff was a limited search. Id. at 721. Justice Thayer, concurring
specially, would hold that the sniff was not a search. Id. at 723. Justice Batchelder,
dissenting, would hold that the sniff was an unreasonable search. Id. at 726.
165. 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990).
166. Id. at 1058.
167. Id. at 1057.
168. Id. at 1058.
169. Id. at 1059.
170. "To hold otherwise [that a sniff is not a search], we believe would raise the
specter of the police roaming indiscriminately through the corridors of public housing
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Place analysis because it provides some judicial review of dog sniffs.
In egregious cases, therefore, the New York Court of Appeals' ap-
proach would allow for the possibility of an unconstitutional dog
sniff.
There are few state court decisions which hold sniffs to be
searches compared with the significantly larger number of states
which hold sniffs are not searches."' However, since a large number
of states have not even addressed this issue since Place was decided,
it stands to reason that these states may yet diverge from the Su-
preme Court's interpretation that a sniff is not a search. Further-
more, many of the states that have followed Place have done so on
federal constitutional grounds. They are not foreclosed therefore
from deciding future dog sniff cases on state grounds if the issue is
properly raised.
III. CANIN SNIFFS SHOULD BE DEEMED SEARCHES
This Part will examine the effects of Place and Jacobsen on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding dog sniffs. It is impor-
tant to note that the discussion is centered on searches (or lack
thereof) in the context of illegal drug activity. This is because the
heightened public and political furor about the "war on drugs" has
created a separate and distinct pressure point on the Fourth
Amendment.17 2 In fact, the vast majority of Fourth Amendment
cases in the beginning of this century concerned prohibition and the
illegal trafficking in alcohol.173 And history often repeats itself.
Section A will examine the significance of deeming investigative
techniques used by law enforcement as "non-searches." Section B
will attempt to delineate the point of incongruence between Place!
Jacobsen and Katz. Section C will offer some suggestions for how
dog sniffs might be brought under the umbrella of the Fourth
Amendment in a workable fashion. In so doing, however, the empha-
sis will be on individual rights as opposed to the current scheme of
deferring to the seemingly insurmountable compelling government
interest.
A. Consequences of Deeming Investigative Techniques
"Non-Searches"
Picture the following scenarios: A thirteen-year-old girl is strip-
searched at school when a dog sniff positively alerts school officials
projects with trained dogs in search of drugs .... Such an Orwellian notion would be
repugnant under our State Constitution ...." Id. at 1058 (citations omitted).
171. Compare supra note 150 with note 151.
172. See generally, Larkosh, supra note 30.
173. See Larkosh, supra note 30 at 1032 ("The Prohibition cases of the 19203
reflect the Court's tendency to sanction and encourage increasingly intrusive methods
utilized by law enforcement officials.").
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to the presence of drugs. No drugs were actually found but it is later
learned that she had played with her own dog who was in heat.
17 4
The dog alerted to some fifty students, only seventeen of whom ac-
tually possessed drugs. 17 5 In Florida, the Highway Patrol sets up
roadblocks to stop 1,500 vehicles for safety inspections as a drug de-
tecting dog walks around the vehicles. One drug arrest is made."0s
These situations actually occurred. Picture further: Police are sta-
tioned at every street corner, armed with drug-detecting canines to
sniff everyone walking past. Police install pen registers on every sus-
pected drug user's private telephone line.'" Enthusiastic Federal
Express employees open every suspicious package and then call in
the Drug Enforcement Agency.17 8 Police stop everyone carrying cash
in their wallets.179 Under current Supreme Court Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, these techniques are not considered searches.
Thus the Fourth Amendment would not be implicated.
These hypotheticals seem offensive to our notions of privacy. Ac-
cording to the majority in Place, however, none of these investiga-
tive techniques would violate the Fourth Amendment. Sadly, a ma-
jority of the public seems to believe that these techniques are
warranted because of the perceived exigencies of the "drug war."15 0
In fact, the effectiveness of intrusive investigative techniques is
questionable when one considers that the amount of drugs entering
the country has only increased in recent years.'9 ' In 1987, the Office
of Technology Assessment concluded:
Despite a doubling of Federal expenditures on interdiction over the
past five years, the quantity of drugs smuggled into the United
174. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979), remanded in part
and aff'd in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
175. See LAFAvE, supra note 17, § 2.2(f), at 372 (1987).
176. Prendergast, Highway Drug Searches Raise Questions, FORT LAUDERDALE
NEws & SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 26, 1984, at A16.
177. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979) (pen register of suspected
thief's telephone).
178. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111 (Federal Express employees
opened damaged package).
179. See LAFAvE, supra note 17, § 2.2(f) n.199 (Supp. 1993). "It has been esti-
mated that most of the cash in circulation (the estimates range from 70% to 97% of
all bills) contains sufficient quantities of cocaine to alert a trained dog. Thus it some-
times happens in practice that a drug dog alert will lead to nothing but currency." Id.
(citations omitted). See also Mark Curriden, Courts Reject Drug-Tainted Evidence,
A.BA. J., Aug. 1993, at 22. This article discusses courts' willingness to overturn drug
possession convictions based upon trace amounts of cocaine on U.S. currency. Appar-
ently, the latest estimate is that cocaine is on 70% of all U.S. currency. Id.
180. See Larkosh, supra note 30 at 1041 (citing Sonnett, War on Drugs-or the
Constitution?, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 27 (citing Washington Post-ABC News poll, Sept.
8, 1989)) (62% of Americans are willing to give up some freedoms to aid war on
drugs, 52% would approve of warrantless searches of homes, 67% would sanction ran-
dom stops of vehicles, 55% supported mandatory drug tests for all Americans).
181. See Wisotsky, supra note 24, at 894.
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States is greater than ever.... There is no clear correlation be-
tween the level of expenditures or effort devoted to interdiction
and the long-term availability of illegally imported drugs in the do-
mestic market. 8 '
This is not to say that the war on drugs is without merit nor that
the war should not be fought. The Constitution, however, must not
be sacrificed in the process.
In the Author's opinion, the Court's present Fourth Amendment
analysis dilutes in unprecedented ways the public's protection from
government incursion. When a technique is deemed "not a search,"
any Fourth Amendment inquiry is foreclosed. As a result, a whole
class of police action is removed from judicial scrutiny. This class
now has a stamp of endorsement from the Supreme Court. A tech-
nique that may have been used by an officer disregarding the war-
rant requirement, a technique approved by the Court, may become
widely used in our society.18 3 If a dog sniff is not a search under any
circumstances, dogs may be employed in situations perhaps never
previously conceived. This Comment suggests that the Court use
greater scrutiny when deeming a particular technique not a search.
B. A Breakdown of Fourth Amendment Analysis
Place'8 stands for three propositions. First, a defendant never has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in drugs. Second, a dog sniff is
constitutionally permissible because it is limited to the detection of
drugs.185 Third, the sniff's limited intrusiveness is outweighed by the
governmental interest involved.
Taking the first proposition, the Court in Jacobsen expounded on
Place with the following statement: "Congress has decided-and
there is no question about its power to do so-to treat the interest
in 'privately' possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental
conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other
182. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. US. CONGR.ss. TnE BoanE WAR ON
DRUGS at 1, 3 (1987).
183. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"Because the requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply only to 'searches' and
'seizures,' an investigative technique that falls within neither category need not be
reasonable and may be employed without a warrant and without probable cause, re-
gardless of the circumstances surrounding its use." Id. at 136-37.
184. As originally decided and later explained in United States u. Jacobsen, id. at
123-25. See supra Part H of this Comment for discussion of Place and Jacobsen.
185. Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Combining this approach with the blanket assumption, implicit in Place
and explicit in [Jacobsen is] that individuals in our society have no reason-
able expectation of privacy in the fact they have contraband in their posses-
sion, the Court adopts a general rule that a surveillance technique does not
constitute a search if it reveals only whether or not an individual possess
contraband.
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arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy inter-
est."1 86 On close examination, however, this approach does not com-
port with the principle articulated in Katz. Katz was held to have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation'
6 7
regardless of the illegality of the content of that conversation.
Place, on the other hand, was afforded no legitimate expectation of
privacy in locked luggage because of the illegal nature of drugs con-
tained therein. Here is a classic case of what Professor Burkoff la-
bels "doublethink."'' 88 A sniff would not have been a "search" if
Place's suitcase had contained drugs, but if Place had no drugs in
his suitcase, he would have had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in his suitcase. Perhaps then a dog sniff would be a search. Basing
the existence of a search on whether the suitcase contained drugs
and not on the physical act of looking for drugs is illogical and in-
consistent with Katz."8 9
The Court finessed this dilemma by acknowledging that although
the owner possesses an interest in privacy, 90 the information ob-
tained by a sniff is "limited" in that the sniff only detects the pres-
ence or absence of drugs. This does not solve the dilemma. On one
hand, the Court disavowed the right to privately possess drugs. On
the other, it suggested that although there is a privacy interest in
luggage, a dog sniff is not a search because of its limited intrusive-
ness. Justice Brennan criticized the Court's novel approach:
It is certainly true that a surveillance technique that identifies
only the presence or absence of contraband is less intrusive than a
technique that reveals the precise nature of an item regardless of
whether it is contraband. But by seizing upon this distinction alone
to conclude that the first type of technique, as a general matter, is
not a search, the Court has foreclosed any consideration of the cir-
cumstances under which the technique is used, and may well have
paved the way for technology to override the limits of law in the
area of criminal investigation.19'
By seizing on the limited nature of the dog sniff to conclude a search
186. Id. at 123. One can only infer from this broad statement that because Con-
gress has deemed drug possession illegal, one never has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in drugs.
187. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 353.
188. See generally Burkoff supra note 25.
189. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 135 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Presumably, the premise of Place was that an individual could not have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the presence or absence of narcotics in his luggage.").
Katz was afforded constitutional protection, regardless of the content of his speech.
See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
190. "We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents
of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment." United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
191. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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had not occurred, the Court deviated from its own analysis in Katz.
Katz rejected the government's contention that the lack of physical
penetration precluded operation of the Fourth Amendment. It
stated, "once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and
seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure. ' 192 It is troubling that the Court in Place found the
lack of physical intrusion into the suitcase controlling on the issue of
whether a search had occurred. If the Fourth Amendment protects
"people and not places," the inquiry should have focused on Place
and his reasonable expectations of privacy, without regard to the
contents of his suitcase. The Court's response to this issue was given
in Jacobsen: no one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
drugs. 9
3
Thus, the first and second propositions of Place are irretrievably
linked. First, a person never has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in drugs and, second, because a dog sniff is limited in terms of the
information obtained, a dog sniff is not a search. The third proposi-
tion is more implicit than explicit. It appears that the Court applied
a balancing test to determine whether or not the limited intrusive-
ness of a sniff outweighed any privacy expectation in luggage.
The fallacy upon which the balancing test relied is that the Court
compared a sniff to a full-blown search when it stated "[t]hus, the
manner in which information is obtained through [dog sniffs] is
much less intrusive than a typical search. . . .This limited disclo-
sure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to
the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate
and more intrusive investigative methods."' ' To be sure, a sniff is
less intrusive than pawing through someone's private belongings,
but the comparison itself acknowledged that a sniff entails a mea-
sure of intrusiveness. The question of search, then, is determined by
a sliding scale of intrusiveness; that is, if the sniff is only "mini-
mally" intrusive, the technique is not a search. This is not an unrea-
sonable proposition but it raises the suspicion that once technology
has developed minimally intrusive methods to obtain information
about citizens, then the Fourth Amendment will become a dead
letter. 19
5
192. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 353 (1967).
193. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 (1984).
194. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (1983).
195. Professor LaFave, in response to the Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland
(holding that the use of a pen register was not a search), stated that Smith "an-
nounced, in effect, the ominous proposition that modern technology cannot add to
one's justified expectation of privacy, but can only detract from it." LAFAvw, supra
note 17, § 2.7(b), at 506 (2d ed. 1987).
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There is something inherently offensive about applying balancing
tests to protections of the Fourth Amendment. ' The protections
guaranteed by this Amendment are fundamental to individual free-
dom. Although the Fourth Amendment should protect the individ-
ual from government encroachment, the Court more often empha-
sizes the compelling government interest when sustaining
government action.'9 7 Moreover, in the area of drug enforcement,
the fact is that the government is fighting a losing battle. 98 But the
more society worries about the "war on drugs" and crime, the heav-
ier the reasonableness balance is tipped in favor of the government.
Under this type of analysis, requiring a warrant will always be re-
garded as unreasonably burdensome. The warrant requirement
should not so easily be put aside for the convenience of law enforce-
ment. After all, the purpose of the warrant requirement is to pre-
vent enforcement officials from exercising on-the-spot discretion in
evaluating whether their actions are reasonable. Rather, the decision
to search should be made by a neutral official.299
In the context of the Fourth Amendment, civil libertarians always
begin from a point of weakness; namely, the defendant is seeking
exclusion of incriminating evidence. There is usually no question
that the defendant was in possession of drugs; therefore, it is diffi-
cult for the defendant to overcome the presumption of guilt.200 Not-
withstanding this presumption, Justice Scalia recently authored a
majority opinion that stated, "there is nothing new in the realization
that the Court sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order
to protect the privacy of us all."'20 ' This is the true purpose of the
Fourth Amendment-to protect society as a whole from government
196. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 718 (there are only "isolated excep-
tions to the general rule that the Fourth Amendment itself has already performed the
constitutional balance between police objectives and personal privacy.") (Brennan, J.,
concurring in result) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 706 (1981) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting)).
197. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985).
198. See Wisotsky, supra note 24, at 894.
199. In Justice Jackson's words, "[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or government enforcement agent." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948).
200. Although law enforcement misconduct is not politically desirable, it is
an unfortunate fact of life that, in general, the only time that courts deal
with police search and seizure abuses is when the misconduct has been pro-
ductive, i.e., has netted, however fortuitously, evidence of criminal activity
which is the subject of suppression proceedings.
Burkoff, supra note 25, at 523-24. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are particularly
difficult to protect because their 'advocates are usually criminals.' ") (citing Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
201. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
[Vol. 46:151
1994] DOG SNIFFS & THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 185
intrusion, sometimes at the expense of a small number of criminals
slipping through the cracks. The net result of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment would be to raise the standard of government conduct.
In the realm of drugs, however, the Court has committed all society
to bear the brunt of intrusive government activity to "win the war."
We are now subjected to sniffing dogs in the airport, in the
mailroom, at school and perhaps even in our homes-all this, be-
cause a sniff is not a search.
As demonstrated in Parts I and II, when an investigative tech-
nique is deemed to fall outside the Fourth Amendment, there can be
no subsequent judicial determination of the appropriate use of that
technique. Each decision that implicitly approves of a technique in
the first instance means that the technique can be adopted on a
wholesale basis. In other words, because the Court has deemed that
dog sniffs are not searches, police have broad discretion to use police
dogs, unfettered by judicial control.
C. A Better Way
If the Supreme Court had acknowledged that a dog sniff was a
search, a wholly different analysis could have been adopted. The
question still remaining is what type of analysis should the Court
have engaged in to evaluate the search? Clearly, responsible use of
police dogs is an efficient and minimally intrusive method to obtain
information about the presence or absence of drugs. The point is not
to exclude the use of dogs, but rather to regulate their use by ac-
knowledging the relative interests of the individual and government.
Once a search is acknowledged, courts should then focus upon the
expectation of privacy held by the individual in the area sniffed, and
balance this interest against the legitimate need for the intrusion.
Thus, a canine sniff of luggage may be reasonable if the police can
point to a reasonably articulable suspicion that the luggage contains
drugs. Alternatively, courts may conclude that a passenger has a re-
duced expectation of privacy in their luggage, which makes the gov-
ernment's pressing need to stem the importation of drugs more im-
portant. Courts may also require the government to show probable
cause to believe the presence of drugs in order to justify a warrant-
less canine sniff of a person or of a home. This would be consistent
with the traditionally higher expectation of privacy accorded to
homes and persons. On the other hand, a police dog stationed on
every street corner, sniffing pedestrians clearly would be inappropri-
ate. Acknowledging that the sniff is a search allows the courts to
require differing justifications depending upon the intrusion, and
subjects police conduct to judicial scrutiny.
Pennsylvania has recently adopted such an approach. In Corn-
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monwealth v. Johnston, °2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
jected the United States Supreme Court's approach to dog sniffs in
Place and proceeded to acknowledge that a canine sniff was a search
under its state constitution. In Johnston, police suspected that a
warehouse was being used to store drugs. Because the police did not
know which locker contained drugs, the police walked a drug-snif-
fing canine through the corridor, whereupon the dog indicated to the
locker containing the marijuana. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
agreed with Justice Brennan's dissent in Place and argued that
there should be no balancing of the relative interests in order to de-
termine whether a search had occurred because the balance had al-
ready been struck by the Fourth Amendment itself.20 3 The question
instead was whether the search implicated the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement.
This analysis, the court explained, necessarily required a balanc-
ing test.204 The court acknowledged that a warrant should not be
required for all dog sniffs alike but further stated: "[I]t is our view
that a free society will not remain free if police may use this, or any
other crime detection device, at random and without reason."20 0
Thus, the main objection of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the
majority holding in Place was that Place did not provide for any
judicial review of the use of police dogs.208
The court decided that there was a middle ground to be struck
between rejecting the use of all dog sniffs and exempting all sniffs
from the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, in order to use
the dog without a warrant, the police must "articulate reasonable
grounds" for believing that drugs were present in the area sniffed,
and show that they were lawfully present in the place where the
sniff was conducted. 207 Applying this test to the facts in Johnston,
the court held that the use of the dog was constitutional. 0 8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its decision
in Johnston and further held that the use of a police dog to sniff a
person required probable cause. In Commonwealth v. Martin,2 0 9 the
court held unconstitutional under the state constitution the use of a
dog to sniff a satchel carried by the Defendant. In applying a stricter
standard than the one adopted in Johnston, the court stated:
In this case, however, the search is that of a person, not a place,
202. 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987).
203. Id. at 78.
204. Id. at 79.
205. Id.
206. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "The consequence of this holding
[in Place], of course, is that police use of narcotics detection dogs in the context of
Place facts need not be justified or explained under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 80.
209. 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993).
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and accordingly, we believe that different interests are
implicated....
Because the search in this case involved Martin's person, we be-
lieve that in addition to being lawfully in place at the time of the
search, the police must have probable cause to believe that a ca-
nine search of a person will produce contraband or evidence of a
crime. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity will not suffice.110
The dog sniff at issue in the case failed this stricter standard. There-
fore, not only was the Pennsylvania Supreme Court willing to reject
the United States Supreme Court's analysis and to independently
interpret its state constitution, but the Pennsylvania court was also
actively engaged in developing a distinct Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence for dog sniffs. Over time, the Pennsylvania court will as-
suredly have to elaborate further upon the standards required by
the police when novel dog search situations present themselves for
review.
The most recent word from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
noteworthy for another reason. The majority in Martin drew a con-
nection between the war on drugs and the shrinking scope of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence:
We are mindful that government has a compelling interest in
eliminating the flow of illegal drugs into our society, and we do not
seek to frustrate the effort to rid society of this scourge. But all
things are not permissible even in the pursuit of a compelling state
interest. The Constitution does not cease to exist merely because
the government's interest is compelling. A police state does not
arise whenever crime gets out of hand.2 '
In an equally unequivocal tone, Justice Cappy concurred with the
following:
To reason that absent probable cause, a dog, cat, or any other
animal sniffing a person or the personal belongings which that citi-
zen is carrying, is anything other than an insufferable intrusion, is
in my view, unacceptable ....
Much has been compromised in the name of the war on drugs. But
let it ring clear that in Pennsylvania, no matter how well intended
or compelling the government interest in ridding ourselves of the
illicit drug trade, our unwavering belief in the sanctity and integ-
rity of personal privacy constrains us to conclude that no citizen
should be subjected to a governmental intrusion of this nature, ab-
sent probable cause.21 2
Clearly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is willing to take only so
much Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from the United States Su-
210. Id. at 560.
211. Id. at 561.
212. Id. at 563 (Cappy, J., concurring).
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preme Court. In addition, Martin marks a possible turning point in
the war on drugs; Pennsylvania refuses to subscribe to the view that
all of our privacy interests should be sacrificed in the face of a com-
pelling governmental interest. Nor will the presence or absence of a
search depend upon the nature of the item sought. Rather, at least
in Pennsylvania, the people's right to privacy from the intrusive ca-
nine nose is superior to government interests that cannot be clearly
justified according to judicially recognized standards of government
conduct.
CONCLUSION
It is not the Author's intention to characterize the use of drug
sniffing dogs as unreasonable. The amount of drug use, smuggling,
and the inevitable accompanying violence is crippling inner cities
and rural areas alike. The Author, however, takes issue with the
United States Supreme Court's method for denying that a sniff is a
search. To not label a sniff a search is disingenuous at best and at
worst rejects the well-reasoned Fourth Amendment analysis set
forth in United States v. Katz. Instead of stating a hasty assertion,
the Court would better serve the Fourth Amendment by reexamin-
ing the issue using Katz as its starting point of analysis. People hold
expectations of privacy which should not depend upon the nature of
the item sought. In other words, the illegal nature of the item should
be irrelevant as to the issue of whether a person holds a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area intruded upon by law enforcement
officers. The Court would remain true to the spirit of the Constitu-
tion if it deemed a sniff a search, and then followed Pennsylvania's
recent approach to analyzing canine sniffs. The Supreme Court
should be wary of removing a class of investigative tools from the
Fourth Amendment purview since absolute removal precludes judi-
cial inquiry into the reasonableness of the official action. In drawing
false distinctions between what is and what is not a "search," the
Court has left a significant amount of discretion with law enforce-
ment officials to judge the reasonableness of their own conduct.
Clearly, a handful of states have rejected the Supreme Court's
analysis in United States v. Place. Even if the Supreme Court does
not revisit the dog sniff issue in Place, defendants still have a viable
opportunity to challenge the use of sniffing dogs in state courts on
state grounds. Many state courts have not yet had the opportunity
to analyze the constitutionality of dog sniffs. If more states follow
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's lead in reevaluating how much
government intrusion the Fourth Amendment (or the state's
equivalent), is capable of withstanding in the name of the "war on
drugs," the Supreme Court may well be forced to revisit its decision
in Place.
Hope Walker Hall
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